Introduction
On the 'doomsday clock' of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which intends to caution 'how close humanity is to catastrophic destruction', 'climate change' joins the other two alarmist categories, namely 'nuclear,' and 'biosecurity'. At the same time, there is a grudging acknowledgement of the fact, at least by some, that the geopolitics of fear, deployed at diverse sites by different agenciesindividually and/or collectively -in pursuit of various interests and agendas, has failed to yield the desired results, including a change in public and private behavior and for that matter the ushering in of radical social movements (Lilley 2012). On the contrary, it appears to have resulted in 'catastrophe fatigue, the paralyzing effects of fear, the pairing of overwhelmingly bleak analysis with inadequate solutions, and a misunderstanding of the process of politicization ' (ibid.:16; emphasis added) . Could this be the reason that some of these multifaceted discourses of fear -that somehow remain open to political contestation and interrogation -are now being scaled up and upgraded by various regulatory agencies and alliances to the discourse of 'climate terror'? This discourse can only have counter-terror as its Other in order to completely erase the hope (the Other of fear) of re-ordering and regulating spaces and societies allegedly more vulnerable to climate change and its threat-multiplying effects. Is climate terror an apparatus of govern-mentality that aims at erasing not only the collective memories of historically perpetuated environmental injustices by the powers that be, but also hopes to contain growing resistance in various parts of the globe (especially the global North) against the emerging architecture of domination and dependencies? Of course, the separation between North and South is a useful category, marking out the affluent lives of the minority versus those of the less affluent majority. But, like any border (as mentioned in the preface of this book), it is drawn subjectively and imperfectly to demarcate territories (Doyle and Chaturvedi 2010).
As pointed out by Eddie Yuen (2012: 37), 'The prevalence of fearbased catastrophism reveals the depth of acceptance of the assumption of rational choice theory in both natural and social sciences. The assumption of a certain kind of instrumental rationality undergirds the delusional belief that if only people could understand the scientific facts, they will change their behavior and trust the experts.' This entails putting a heavy gloss over a set of deeply political and politicizing questions at a time when the lure of the post-political is gaining traction but not without inviting a micro geopolitics of resistance.
Can we say that 'climate terror' is the accumulated, collective outcome of steadily proliferating fears, with each fear serving to endow its anticipatory regimes with 'expertise' and 'clinical authority'? What kind of language, imaginaries and metaphors are being deployed to frame and communicate climate change, by whom and why? What is the politics behind the written geographies of climate change, and how and why are largely Afro-Asian places and people being framed and implicated in various geographies of catastrophe and fear? What are the implications that these discourses carry for understanding climate change and choosing 'appropriate' policy options and responses? What minimum ethical principles related to equity are needed to ensure that the impacts of policies to address climate change are perceived as equitable by key stakeholders (Giddens 2008: 4) and do not result in further marginalization of the much less fortunate losers of corporation globalization?
Structure of the book and its order of exposition
In Chapter 1 of the book, our key engagement focusing the rhetoric of 'climate terror' is pitched at a number of theoretical perspectives that inform 'critical geopolitics' essentially as a relentless interrogation of the politics and even depoliticizing politics of domination. While being 'critical', we do not dismiss state-centric classical geopolitics out of hand since we believe that nation-states, irrespective of their geoeconomic and geopolitical locations, continue to matter a good deal in international geopolitical economy. For example, low-lying Bangladesh and Maldives are 'vulnerable', not only because of their vulnerable
